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 When the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992,1 it replaced Roe v. 
Wade’s strict scrutiny analysis2 with a looser standard,3 the undue 
burden test.4 Casey demarcated a monumental paradigm shift and 
opened the door to more abortion regulation than was permitted under 
                                                 
 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; 2014–2015 Managing Editor of the CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW; 
Master of Urban and Regional Planning & Master of Urban Design, University of 
Michigan; B.A., Art, Kalamazoo College.  
1 See generally 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154–56 (1986). 
3 John A. Robertson, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, 
Viability, and Early Prenatal Diagnosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 329 (2011) 
(explaining “Casey opened the door to more regulation than had been acceptable 
under Roe.”). 
4 Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79. 
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Roe.5 State legislatures began to promulgate new laws6 and as 
momentum grew to increasingly regulate abortion in the United States, 
the federal government passed the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act in 2003.7  
In 2007, the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act was challenged in Gonzales v. Carhart8 because the Act prohibited 
abortion doctors from performing the “most common type of second 
trimester abortion in the United States.”9 Writing for the Carhart 
Court, Justice Kennedy informally began to reshape the undue burden 
test by allowing inklings of rational basis review to seep into the 
Court’s analysis.10 The Court’s decision to uphold the law opened the 
floodgates to increased abortion regulation.11 “The holding was seen 
as a victory by anti-abortion forces, who saw an opportunity to “chip 
away” at the abortion doctrine established by Roe.”12 
Although the Casey and Carhart opinions did not overturn Roe, 
“anti-abortion lawmakers interpreted the rulings . . . as an indication to 
reverse Roe’s main principles.”13 Pro-life members of state legislatures 
began testing the boundaries of the undue burden test.14 Legislators 
began passing new laws, designed to chip away at a woman’s 
fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy. 15 These laws 
have taken an array of forms. The Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
                                                 
5 Sybil Shainwald, Reproductive Injustice in the New Millennium, 20 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 123, 153 (2013) (citation omitted). 
6 Id. at 154. 
7 See id. at 153–54 (citing Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-105, § 1, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003)). 
8 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
9 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 153. 
10 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158. 
11 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 153. 
12 Id.  
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Providers (TRAP) laws are particularly common;16 these laws are 
typically designed to restrict abortion services to licensed clinics or 
hospitals, and require abortion providers to acquire additional 
licenses.17 Forty-five states have passed TRAP laws that subject 
physicians performing abortion to stringent regulations, which are “not 
placed on comparable healthcare providers.”18 
This Comment focuses on one specific type of TRAP law: state 
statutes that require a doctor who performs abortions to have admitting 
privileges at a hospital within a certain radius of an abortion clinic. 19 
More specifically, this Comment focuses on a Wisconsin statute signed 
into law in July 2013 that requires abortion doctors to have admitting 
privileges at a hospital within a thirty-mile radius of a clinic where 
abortions are performed.20  
Although the scope of the question presented to the Seventh 
Circuit in Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen was 
limited to the appropriateness of the district court’s issuance of a 
preliminary injunction, the majority opinion, written by Judge Posner, 
addressed the constitutional questions surrounding this statute.21 Judge 
Posner suggested that the Wisconsin admitting privileges statute 
placed an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion and that the 
statute bears no rational relation to furthering its stated purpose of 
                                                 
16 Id. at 155. 
17 Linda J. Wharton & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving Roe v. Wade . . . When You 
Win Only Half the Loaf, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 157 n.90 (2013). 
18 Id. at 157. 
19
 See id. at 165 (“The recent imposition of unnecessary and burdensome 
regulations targeting abortion providers over other medical professionals is an 
obvious attempt to increase costs, prevent ease of access to abortion care, and drive 
these physicians out of practice”) (citing Lisa M. Brown, The TRAP: Targeted 
Regulations of Abortion Providers, NAT’; ABORTION FED’N, 
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/facts/trap_laws.html.  
20 Wis. Stat § 253.095(2) (2013). In the state of Wisconsin 97 percent of 
abortions are performed in clinics. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 
738 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2013). 
21 See generally Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786.  
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protecting maternal health.22 Additionally, he observed that the statute 
singles-out abortion doctors and subjects them to additional oversight 
not required for similarly situated physicians, which violates equal 
protections of the law.23 This Comment argues that Judge Posner 
accurately assessed the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s admitting 
privilege statute. Furthermore, it argues that when the Supreme Court 
evaluates the constitutionality of admitting privileges TRAP laws, it 
should use Judge Posner’s reasoning as a guide to strike down those 
laws.24 
First, this Comment provides a brief overview of the 
transformation of the constitutional analysis of abortion regulation 
from a strict scrutiny analysis to the undue burden test and briefly 
describes TRAP laws. It also describes the facts, procedural posture, 
and holding of Van Hollen. Then, it briefly describes the Fifth Circuit 
case, Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. 
Abbott, where a similar statute was at issue, yet the court came to a 
radically different conclusion.25 Second, this Comment argues that 
when the Supreme Court has the opportunity to evaluate the 
constitutionality of these admitting privileges statutes, it should use 
Judge Posner’s reasoning in Van Hollen as a guide to strike down the 
laws. Universally, these laws (1) place an undue burden on a woman 
seeking an abortion; (2) bear no rational relation to their stated goal of 
protecting the health of the mother; and (3) violate equal protections of 
the law by discriminating against physicians who perform abortions.  
 
                                                 
22 Id. at 789, 798. 
23 Id. at 790. 
24 See generally id. 
25 See generally Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. 
Abbott, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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First, this background section provides a very brief overview of 
three Supreme Court cases that have critically shaped abortion 
jurisprudence in the United States. Second, it describes TRAP laws 
and the effect these laws have on the regulatory framework for 
abortion in the United States. Third, this section provides relevant 
information about both the Seventh Circuit’s Van Hollen case and the 
Fifth Circuit’s Abbott case.  
 
A. Summary of Abortion Jurisprudence in the United States 
 
The Court first recognized a woman’s fundamental right to 
terminate her pregnancy in its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.26 The 
Court struck down a Texas statute that criminalized abortion except in 
cases where a mother’s life was at risk.27 The Roe Court held that the 
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a right to 
privacy that included a woman’s right to choose to terminate a 
pregnancy.28 However, the Court also concluded that a woman’s 
fundamental right to an abortion was not absolute.29  
Using strict scrutiny to define the outer limits of this fundamental 
right to abortion, the Court found that a state has a compelling interest 
in protecting the health of the mother and potential life.30 It held that a 
state could promulgate “narrowly tailored” regulations to protect these 
interests31 and established guidelines for permissible abortion 
regulations in each trimester of pregnancy.32 In the first trimester 
(weeks 1–12), only basic medical safety regulations were permissible; 
                                                 
26 See generally 410 U.S. 113 (1986). 
27 Id. at 164. 
28 Id. at 152–53. 
29 Id. at 154. 
30 Id. at 154–55. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 163–65.  
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state regulations could not interfere with a woman’s choice to have an 
abortion.33 In the second trimester (weeks 13–27), the Court held there 
was a compelling state interest in the health of the mother and states 
could limit the availability of abortion in this trimester as a means to 
protect this interest.34 In the third trimester (weeks 28–40), the Court 
held that the state had a compelling interest in both the health of the 
mother and in protecting the life of the unborn.35 Thus, states could 
proscribe abortions in the third trimester as long as applicable 
regulations contained a health exception to protect the life of the 
mother.36 
 Fast-forward nineteen years later: in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court tossed out Roe’s 
trimester guidelines but upheld its basic holdings.37 The Casey Court 
made three key holdings. First, a state has a compelling interest in 
protecting maternal health.38 Second, state regulations cannot have the 
effect of placing an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion 
until the point of fetal viability.39 Third, post-viability, the state has a 
compelling interest in potential life and can proscribe post-viability 
abortion.40 These three key holdings transformed how courts evaluate 
a governmental interest in regulating abortions. Casey gave states the 
ability to regulate abortion throughout a woman’s entire pregnancy 
based on compelling state interests in protecting maternal health and 
protecting the potential life of the unborn.41  
 Although Casey limited a state’s ability to regulate pre-viability 
abortions, the Court did not define what types of regulations would 





37 505 U.S. 833, 871–73 (1992). 
38 Id. at 869–70. 
39 Id. at 876–78. 
40 Id. at 869–72. 
41 Id. at 872. 
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create an undue burden for a woman seeking an abortion.42 The Court 
merely stated that a regulation creates an unconstitutional undue 
burden if it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”43 
The Court’s failure to define the terms “undue burden” and 
“substantial obstacle” created ambiguity and opened the door to 
increased abortion regulation.44 
However, while Casey may have opened the door to increased 
abortion regulation, the Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart 
opened the floodgates.45 The Carhart Court upheld the federal Partial 
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which prohibited doctors from 
performing “intact D&E” second trimester abortions.46 The Court held 
that on its face, the prohibition of “intact D&E” late-term pre-viability 
abortions did not place a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion because of the availability of other late-term 
abortion procedures.47 Thus, the Court allowed the federal government 
to establish a blanket prohibition on one specific type of abortion 
procedure. 
Moreover, while writing for the majority in Carhart, Justice 
Kennedy began to unofficially reshape Casey’s undue burden test.48 
He noted that where the regulation “does not impose an undue 
burden,” the State “can use its regulatory power to bar certain 
procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate 
interest in regulating the medical profession [and] . . . to promote 
respect for life.”49 Justice Kennedy stated that when an abortion 
regulation does not have the effect of creating an undue burden, then a 
                                                 
42 See generally id. 
43 Id. at 877. 
44 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 153. 
45 See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
46 Id. at 132, 168. 
47 Id. at 154–56, 164. 
48 See id. at 158. 
49 Id.  
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regulation must stand if the regulation has a rational relationship to 
furthering a legitimate government interest.50 The Court then upheld 
the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.51 The Court held the 
government had a “substantial” interest in protecting the ethics and 
integrity of the medical profession and in protecting potential life,52 
and held that the law was rationally related to furthering these 
interests.53  
However, most notably, the Act was upheld even though it lacked 
a provision permitting doctors to perform the “intact D&E” abortion 
procedure if a doctor believed it was necessary to protect the life of the 
mother.54 The Court reasoned that prohibiting this procedure did not 
create a significant health risk to women because of uncertainty about 
whether it was ever medically necessary for a physician to perform the 
intact D&E procedure.55 Justice Kennedy noted, that the Court has 
“given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation 
in areas where there are medical and scientific uncertainty.”56 Hence, 
the Court allowed the Act to stand despite the fact that it did not 
contain the once required medical exception provision, which would 
permit an otherwise prohibited abortion procedure to be performed 
when maternal life was at risk.  
Thus, post-Carhart, it appears that a state may regulate a pre-
viability abortion as long as these regulations do not place an undue 
burden on a woman seeking an abortion and they have a rational 
relationship to the asserted governmental interest.57 So, “[i]f Casey 
‘opened the door to more regulation than had been acceptable under 
                                                 
50 See id. at 156–60. 
51 Id. at 156–59. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 156–63. 
54 Id. at 161. 
55 Id. at 161–66. 
56 Id. at 163. 
57 See id. at 156–60. 
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Roe,’ . . . Carhart blew the door off its hinges.”58 Anti-abortion 
activists saw Carhart’s holding as an opportunity to continue to “chip 
away” at a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.59 Ever since the 
decisions in Casey and Carhart, anti-abortion activists have advocated 
for abortion regulations that “systematically test the boundaries of 
what the Court meant by ‘undue burden’ and ‘substantial obstacle.’”60  
 
B. The Increased Prevalence of TRAP Laws in the United States since 
Gonzales v. Carhart 
 
Typically, the pro-life movement has taken two approaches to 
undermining Roe and restricting abortion.61 In the first approach, anti-
abortion advocates attempt to pass state statutes that criminalize 
abortion;62 however, these statutes have proven ineffective because 
they fail to pass constitutional muster.63 The second approach to 
undermining Roe has been more successful than the first. In this 
approach, anti-abortion advocates pass laws that are incremental in 
spirit and chip away at a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.64 
These regulations have been described as having the “cumulative 
effect of [creating] legal restrictions short of bans and extralegal 
pressures to restrict the provision of legal abortion services and create 
‘abortion free’ states without criminalization.”65 Anti-abortion activists 
                                                 
58 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 154 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
59 Robertson, supra note 3, at 329–30 (“Even if the scope of new regulatory 
leeway is small, the victory has energized anti-abortion forces to chip away at the 
right recognized in Roe and Casey.”). 
60 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 154. 
61 Dawn Johnsen, “TRAP”ing Roe in Indiana and a Common Ground 
Alternative, 118 YALE L.J. 1356, 1359–60 (2009). 
62 Id. at 1358–59 (explaining that in 2006 and 2008 pro-life activists in South 
Dakota tried to pass a ballot measure criminalizing abortion in direct conflict with 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade). 
63 Id. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1986). 
64 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 154–55. 
65 Johnsen, supra note 61, at 1360. 
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typically argue that these incremental regulations are necessary to 
protect maternal health.66  
In recent years, anti-abortion activists have promulgated one 
particularly popular form of incremental regulations, referred to as 
TRAP laws: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers.67 As of 2013, 
forty-five states have enacted TRAP laws.68 
 
Common TRAP regulations include those that restrict where 
abortion care may be provided. Regulations limiting abortion 
care to hospitals or other specialized facilities, rather than 
physicians’ offices, require doctors to obtain medically 
unnecessary additional licenses, needlessly convert their 
practices into mini-hospitals at a great expense or provide 
abortion services only at hospitals, an impossibility in many 
parts of the country.69  
 
Although individually these laws may appear to only have a 
minimal effect on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion, when 
aggregated, these laws have the effect of heavily regulating abortion 
providers.70 Thus, these TRAP laws compound to significantly 
undermine a woman’s right to abortion services.71 The admitting 
privileges statutes at issue in both Van Hollen and Abbott are 
characterized as TRAP laws. 
 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 154–55. 
68 Id. at 165. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. 
71 See Johnsen, supra note 61, at 1359–60. 
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C. Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin Inc. v. Van Hollen  
 
1. Statement of the Facts 
 
On Friday, July 5, 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into 
law a statute requiring doctors who perform abortions in a clinical 
setting to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of 
the clinic where an abortion is performed.72 By its terms, the statute 
was to become effective three days later, on Monday, July 8, 2013.73  
 
 
2. Procedural Background 
 
Wisconsin’s two abortion providers, Planned Parenthood of 
Wisconsin and Milwaukee Women’s Medical Services, filed suit in 
federal district court on July 5, 2013 challenging the constitutionality 
of the law, and simultaneously moved for a temporary restraining 
order.74 The district court “granted the motion on July 8 and later 
converted it to a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the 
statute pending a trial on the merits.”75 Following the court’s decision, 
state officials appealed the injunction.76 The district court then stayed 
the trial as it awaited Seventh Circuit review of the issuance of the 
preliminary injunction order.77 Judge Posner noted that had 
“enforcement of the statute not been stayed two of the four abortion 
clinics . . . would have had to shut down because none of their doctors 
had admitting privileges at a hospital within the prescribed [thirty-
                                                 
72 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 788. 
75 Id.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
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mile] radius of the clinics, and a third hospital would have lost the 
services of half its staff.”78  
When the district court issued the temporary restraining order 
blocking the admitting privileges statute from going into effect, it used 
a two-part balancing test.79 To receive a preliminary injunction,  
 
a party must show that it has (1) no adequate remedy at law 
and will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is 
denied and (2) some likelihood of success on the merits. If 
the moving party makes this threshold showing, the court 
weighs the factors against one another, assessing whether the 
balance of harms favors the moving party or whether the 
harm to the nonmoving party or the public is sufficiently 
weighty that the injunction should be denied.80 
 
First, the district court analyzed the admitting privileges statute 
under the undue burden test and held that Planned Parenthood would 
likely prevail in a trial on the merits.81 The court reasoned that the law 
did not bear a rational relationship to its purported purpose of 
protecting maternal health.82 The court also stated that the law had the 
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking 
an abortion because it would have a substantial impact on the practical 
availability of abortion in Wisconsin.83 Second, the district court held 
women were likely to suffer irreparable harm if the law was permitted 
to go into effect.84 The Court reasoned that women will be “foreclosed 
from having an abortion in the next week either because of the undue 
                                                 
78 Id. at 789. 
79 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 
(W.D. Wis. 2013). 
80 Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011)) (citing 
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
81 Id. at 865–67. 
82 Id. at 865–66. 
83 Id. at 867–68. 
84 Id. at 868. 
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burden of travel or the late stage of pregnancy, as well as fac[e] 
increasing health risks caused by delay.”85 A few weeks later, the 
district court employed the same balancing test and reasoning when it 
issued a preliminary injunction, which extended the temporary 
restraining order.86 
When the Seventh Circuit reviewed the issuance of the 
preliminary injunction it stated that it must use a deferential standard 
of review because of the “uncertainty involved in balancing the 
considerations that bear on the decision” and the “haste with which the 
district judge must strike the balance.”87 However, when applying the 
balancing test to decide whether issuance of a preliminary injunction 
was appropriate, Judge Posner used language from Casey’s undue 





First, in applying the two-prong balancing test employed by the 
district court, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s issuance 
of a preliminary injunction was justified, pending a trial on the 
merits.89 The Court reasoned that it would be impracticable for 
abortion providers to obtain the statutorily required hospital admitting 
privileges within the three days between the statute’s signing into law 
and its enactment.90 Judge Posner agreed that at a minimum, the 
process for obtaining admitting privileges at a hospital takes two to 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13-cv-465-wmc, 2013 
WL 3989238 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2013).  
87Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 795 (7th Cir. 
2013).  
88 See generally id. 
89 Id. at 798–99. 
90 Id. at 788–89, 793. 
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three months.91 Thus, it was nearly impossible for abortion doctors to 
obtain these privileges within the State mandated timeline.92  
Judge Posner also reasoned that based on the facts in the record, 
enacting the statute would place an undue burden on women seeking 
an abortion, and Planned Parenthood was likely to prevail in a trial on 
the merits.93 He noted that the State did not adequately demonstrate 
that the law had a rational basis or that its enactment furthered its 
stated purpose of protecting the health of a woman having an 
abortion.94 Furthermore, he found that the law would have a 
substantial impact on the “practical” availability of abortion in 
Wisconsin, placing an undue burden on a woman seeking an 
abortion.95 
Second, the court held that Planned Parenthood faced greater 
irreparable harm from immediate enforcement of the statute than the 
State faced by having the enforcement delayed.96 Allowing the law to 
go into effect on July 8 would have forced two and a half of 
Wisconsin’s four abortion clinics to close, subjecting patients to weeks 
of delays while doctors attempted to secure hospital-admitting 
privileges.97 Moreover, Judge Posner reasoned that the State failed to 
demonstrate that Wisconsin is so “rife with serious complications from 
abortions” that the statute needed to take effect immediately.98 
In addition to applying the two-part balancing test, Judge Posner 
observed “an issue of equal protection of the law is lurking in this 
case.”99 He noted that the state appears to be treating doctors who 
perform surgical abortion differently than doctors who perform other 
                                                 
91 Id. at 788. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 788–99. 
94 Id. at 789–90, 798. 
95 See id. at 791–96.  
96 Id. at 793, 795–96. 
97 Id. at 789, 796. 
98 Id. at 797. 
99 Id. at 790. 
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outpatient surgical procedures—even though these other procedures 
are more likely to result in complications requiring hospitalization.100 
The Analysis section of this article describes Judge Posner’s reasoning 
in more detail and explains why the Supreme Court should use his 
reasoning as a guide when it hears a case involving an admitting 
privileges statute. 
 
D. Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. 
Abbott 
 
The Seventh Circuit is not the only federal circuit court to hear a 
case involving a state statute requiring abortion doctors to have 
hospital admitting privileges. In 2013, the Fifth Circuit decided 
Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. 
Abbott, which presented the same issue as Van Hollen.101 However, 
contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Van Hollen, the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision stayed the district court’s preliminary injunction and 
permitted the law to go into effect.102 The court reasoned that the 
admitting privileges statute was unlikely to place an undue burden on 
a woman seeking an abortion.103 
Two amendments to Texas abortion laws were at issue in 
Abbott.104 Similar to the Wisconsin law, one of the amendments at 
issue required doctors performing abortions in Texas to have admitting 
privileges “on the date of the procedure” at a hospital located no more 
than thirty miles from the clinic where the “abortion is performed.”105 
The Texas legislature passed its law on July 12, 2013 and it was to 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 
F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013). 
102 Id. at 410, 419. 
103 Id. at 416. 
104 The other amendment at issue in this case “[L]imits the use of abortion-
inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), with limited exceptions.” Id. at 409. 
105 Id. 
15
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take effect on October 29, 2013.106 Thus, the time between signing 
into law and the effective date of the Texas statute distinguished it 
from the Wisconsin statute; whereas abortion doctors in Wisconsin had 
three days to clamor for abortion privileges,107 doctors in Texas had a 
little over three months to secure these privileges.108 
Planned Parenthood of Texas brought a suit challenging the 
constitutionality of the amendments in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas in September of 2013.109 Following a 
three-day bench trial, the district court struck down the portion of the 
law requiring doctors to have hospital admitting privileges.110 The 
court stated that the law was “without a rational basis and places a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus.”111 The court enjoined the enforcement of that 
provision.112 The State appealed the judgment.113  
The issue before the Fifth Circuit was “the disposition of the 
State’s motion to stay the district court’s permanent injunction pending 
the outcome of the appeal on the merits.”114 Writing for the court, 
Judge Owen stated that the court must use a four-factor balancing test 
to decide whether to grant the stay pending appeal.115 The four factors 
used were: (1) whether the applicant [the State] made a strong 
showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the State 
will be “irreparably injured” if a stay is not granted; (3) whether 
                                                 
106 See id. 
107 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 788 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
108 See Abbott, 734 F.3d at 409. 
109 Id. at 409–10. 
110 Id. at 410. 
111 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 
F. Supp. 2d 891, 896–97 (W.D. Tex. 2013). 
112 Id. at 909. 
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issuing the stay would “substantially injure the other parties interested 
in the proceeding;” and (4) “where the public interest lies.”116 
The court addressed the first factor at length in its opinion, and 
only very briefly addressed the three other factors.117 The court 
reasoned that the State demonstrated that it was likely to succeed on 
the merits because the State’s “substantial interests” in regulating the 
medical profession provided a rational basis for the law.118 After 
making this determination, the court weaved Casey’s undue burden 
test into its reasoning to demonstrate why the State is likely to succeed 
in a trial on the merits.119  
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit decided that there is “a substantial 
likelihood that the State will prevail in its argument. The Court 
decided that Planned Parenthood failed to demonstrate that an undue 
burden would be placed on women seeking abortions or that the 
hospital-admitting-privileges requirement creates a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.”120 The Court 
held that, on its face, the text of the law does not “indicate that its 
purpose is ‘to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion,’”121 and the law furthers a substantial 
governmental interest in regulating the medical profession.122 
Ultimately, the court found that requiring hospital admitting privileges 
did not place an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion in a 
large “fraction” of cases, and for this reason, it passed constitutional 
muster.123 
 
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 See generally id.  
118 Id. 411–12. 
119 See id. at 412–16. 
120 Id. at 416. 
121 Id. at 413–14 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)). 
122 Id. at 411–12. 
123 Id. at 414–15. 
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The underlying cases in Van Hollen and Abbott have yet to be 
decided on their merits. However, the Supreme Court will likely soon 
weigh the constitutionality of admitting privileges TRAP laws because 
of their growing prevalence throughout the United States.124 Currently, 
ten states require abortion doctors to have hospital admitting privileges 
or an alternate arrangement,125 and courts in four more states 
(including Wisconsin) have temporarily blocked the enforcement of 
similar statutes.126 When asked to decide whether these admitting 
privileges laws are constitutional, the Supreme Court should strike 
them down. Even individually, these laws impose an unconstitutional 
undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion, let alone when they 
are aggregated. 
TRAP laws substantially impact the practical availability of 
abortions in a state because clinics are forced to close as doctors try to 
obtain the requisite privileges from hospitals.127 Moreover, hospital 
credential committees have complete discretion over whether to grant 
a physician admitting privileges.128 These committees can justify 
denying privileges to physicians who perform surgical abortions using 
an array of unweighed and subjective criteria without violating federal 
                                                 
124 Erik Eckholm, Access to Abortion Falling as States Pass Restrictions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/us/women-losing-access-
to-abortion-as-opponents-gain-ground-in-state-legislatures.html?src=xps. 
125 Guttmacher Inst., State Policy Regulations in Brief as of March 1, 2014: 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf (describing an alternate 
arrangement as having an agreement with another physician who has admitting 
privileges). 
126 Eckholm, supra note 124 (noting Alabama, Mississippi and North Dakota 
have temporarily blocked these statutes). 
127 See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 791–97 
(7th Cir. 2013). 
128 Id. at 791–93. 
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law.129 Although these admitting privileges laws are unconstitutional 
when standing alone, they become even more unduly burdensome 
when combined with other abortion regulations because they 
unreasonably restrict the practical availability of abortion.130  
Furthermore, admitting privileges statutes bear no rational 
relationship to their purported purpose of protecting maternal health. 
There is no medical justification for requiring these privileges. Less 
than 1-percent of surgical abortions result in complications requiring 
hospitalization,131 thus no legitimate medical basis exists to justify 
requiring abortion doctors to have admitting privileges.132 Moreover, 
best practices within the United States’ medical community do not 
require physicians performing outpatient surgeries that are similar to 
surgical abortion to provide an additional level of “continuity of care” 
to their patients.133 In fact, admitting privileges laws raise 
constitutional equal protections concerns because abortion doctors 
receive disparate treatment when compared to other similarly situated 
medical professionals.134 
Thus, momentum to hear a case addressing this specific type of 
TRAP law is building. These laws severely restrict a woman’s ability 
to exercise her right to terminate her pregnancy without bearing any 
rational relationship to their purported purpose of protecting maternal 
health. In fact, these laws do nothing more than discriminate against 
abortion providers. Due to the controversial nature of these laws, it is 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 See Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Abortion 
Laws, 2–3 (Apr. 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf 
(showing how many states layer regulations on top of each other creating a heavily 
regulated environment for abortion providers and their patients). 
131 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 797.  
132 Id. at 790. 
133 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 
(W.D. Wis. 2013). 
134 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 790.  
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unsurprising that some Supreme Court Justices have expressed that 
they fully expect to hear the Abbott case on appeal.135  
When the Supreme Court finally decides to weigh in on the 
constitutionality of these admitting privileges statutes, it should use 
Judge Posner’s reasoning in Van Hollen as a guide. First, the Court 
should apply Casey’s undue burden test to strike down these laws 
because they place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion. Second, even if the Court decides that these laws 
do not have the effect of placing an undue burden on a woman, they 
cannot survive the rational basis review prescribed by Carhart because 
they do not bear any rational relation to their asserted purpose of 
protecting maternal health. Third, these laws violate equal protections 
of the law because they require physicians who perform abortions to 
have an additional layer of oversight that is not required for other 
similarly situated physicians.  
 
A. Requiring Abortion Doctors to have Hospital Admitting Privileges 
Places an Undue Burden on a Woman Seeking an Abortion 
 
By requiring physicians who perform abortions in outpatient 
clinics to have admitting privileges at a local hospital, state 
governments place an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion 
because this requirement substantially impacts the practical 
availability of abortion.136 For example, after the Fifth Circuit stayed 
the law at issue in Abbott, one-third of Texas’ thirty-some abortion 
clinics closed their doors as doctors tried to secure admitting 
privileges,137 “[leaving] much of South Texas without any abortion 
clinics.”138 Similarly, Judge Posner anticipated that if the Wisconsin’s 
statute goes into effect, two-and-a-half of the state’s four abortion 
                                                 
135 Eckholm, supra note 124. 
136 See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 791–97.  
137 Eckholm, supra note 124. 
138 Id. 
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clinics would be forced to close.139 Thus, when contemplating these 
TRAP laws within the context of the overall abortion policy landscape 
of the United States, it is clear that Judge Posner’s reasoning in Van 
Hollen is applicable beyond the borders of Wisconsin. These laws 
substantially affect the practical availability of abortion in a given state 
and impose an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion. 
 In Van Hollen, Judge Posner reasoned that the enactment of these 
TRAP laws would substantially restrict the practical availability of 
abortion in Wisconsin. First, Judge Posner reasoned that the three-day 
window abortion providers needed to obtain admitting privileges in 
Wisconsin was impracticable.140 Second, he explained that hospitals 
have discretion when granting admitting privileges,141 and this 
discretion makes it difficult to predict which doctors will receive 
admitting privileges and will likely impede women’s access to 
abortion services.142 Third, Judge Posner reasoned that “virtually all 
abortions in Wisconsin” are performed in Planned Parenthood’s four 
clinics, and a “significant fraction” of Planned Parenthood’s doctors 
did not have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of a 
clinic.143  
 
1. The Unreasonable Timeframe for Wisconsin Doctors to Acquire 
Hospital Admitting Privileges  
 
When Judge Posner affirmed the district court’s issuance of the 
preliminary injunction, he wrote, “[t]he impossibility of compliance 
with the statute even by doctors fully qualified for admitting privileges 
is a compelling reason for the preliminary injunction, albeit a reason 
that diminishes with time.”144 He noted that it was “unquestioned” that 
                                                 
139 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 789, 791.  
140 Id. at 788. 
141 Id. at 788–89. 
142 See id. 
143 Id. at 791. 
144 Id. at 789. 
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it usually takes a “minimum of two to three” months for a doctor to 
obtain hospital-admitting privileges because hospital credential 
committees typically only meet once a month to make these 
decisions.145 Thus, Judge Posner held that the impossibility of 
statutory compliance within the three-day timeframe was a sufficient 
reason for the issuing the preliminary injunction.146 Judge Manion also 
concurred with Judge Posner’s decision on this ground.147 However, in 
writing for the court, Judge Posner moved beyond the impossibility of 
statutory compliance within the three-day timeframe and addressed 
substantive reasons that the statute created an unconstitutional undue 
burden on women.148 Judge Posner’s reasoning regarding these 
substantive issues is universally applicable to this type of TRAP law 
and should be used to strike down these laws across the United States. 
 
2. Hospitals have Discretion in Granting Doctors Admitting Privileges 
 
In Van Hollen, Judge Posner reasoned that the statute at issue 
would substantially affect the practical availability of abortion in 
Wisconsin because hospital credential committees have full discretion 
when deciding whether to grant admitting privileges to a doctor.149 He 
noted that “[h]ospitals are permitted rather than required to grant such 
privileges,”150 and requiring these privileges will cause delays in a 
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.151 Hospital credential 
committees typically only meet once a month and the process typically 
takes at least three months.152 Moreover, the criteria used by hospital 
credential committees to decide which doctors will receive admitting 
                                                 
145 Id. at 788. 
146 Id. at 788–89. 
147 Id. at 799 (Manion, J., concurring). 
148 See generally id. (majority opinion). 
149 Id. at 791–93. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. 
152 Id. 
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privileges are not uniform—the criteria may vary from hospital to 
hospital.153 As Planned Parenthood noted in its brief to the Seventh 
Circuit: 
 
Barriers to obtaining privileges include hospital requirements 
that physicians admit a minimum number of patients each 
year; requirements that physicians live in the vicinity of the 
hospital; and requirements that physicians identify other 
physicians with privileges at the same hospital willing to 
provide back-up coverage. In addition, some hospitals have 
‘closed’ staff requirements, such as academic hospitals that 
only privilege faculty members or hospitals that only 
privilege doctors who belong to certain private physician 
practices.154 
 
The criteria used to determine whether a doctor will receive 
admitting privileges is “multiple, various and unweighed,”155 and as 
such, the process used for granting these privileges is not 
mechanical—it is an art. Thus, it is difficult to predict which doctors 
will be granted these privileges.156 Supporters of these statutes argue 
that federal law (the “Church Amendments”) prohibits hospitals that 
receive federal funding, including religiously affiliated hospitals, from 
denying admitting privileges to doctors who perform abortions.157 
However, this argument is flawed.  
First, hospital administrators may not even be aware of the 
Church Amendments. As mentioned in Van Hollen, one of the 
Wisconsin State Senators responsible for promulgating the admitting 
privileges TRAP law and the chief medical officer of a Catholic 
                                                 
153 Id. at 792. 
154 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 8, Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van 
Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (2014) (No. 13-2726). 
155 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 792. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 791 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300a–7(c)(1)(B)). 
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Hospital in Wisconsin were unaware the Church Amendments even 
existed.158 The chief medical officer, Rita Hanson, wrote in an email, 
“Wheaton Franciscan Healthcare is a ministry of the Catholic Church 
. . . [f]or that reason, if it's known to us that a doctor performs 
abortions and that doctor applies for privileges at one of our hospitals, 
our hospital board would not grant privileges."159 
Second, as Judge Posner explained, even if religiously affiliated 
hospitals are aware of the Church Amendments, hospitals can easily 
argue that an abortion doctor was denied privileges on grounds other 
than the doctor’s provision of abortion services.160 The process for 
granting admitting privileges is not objective and mechanical; it is 
subjective and amorphous. Hospital administrators are not required to 
use standardized criteria to decide which physicians are granted 
admitting privileges, making difficult—if not impossible—for a 
physician who performs abortions to prove that he has been unlawfully 
denied these privileges.161 For example, Judge Posner stated that the 
Senior Counsel for the National Women’s Law Center found: 
 
[I]n other states that have recently passed privileges 
requirements for abortion providers, religiously affiliated 
hospitals have denied the doctors’ applications by citing their 
failure to meet other standards, such as admitting a certain 
number of patients per year. In Mississippi, a Baptist hospital 
did not provide doctors at an abortion clinic with an 
application for privileges because none of its staff would 
write letters in support of the doctors, according to a court 
                                                 
158 Id. at 792 (citing Akbar Ahmed, Court file shows confusion over Wisconsin 
abortion regulation, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINAL (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/court-file-shows-confusion-over-
wisconsin-abortion-regulation-law-b9961373z1-217196251.html). 
159 Id.  
160 Id. 
161 See id. at 791–92. 
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affidavit provided by the clinic’s attorneys at the Center for 
Reproductive Rights.162 
 
An example from Texas further highlights the subjective criteria used 
to evaluate whether to grant a doctor admitting privileges. Recently, 
University General Hospital Dallas revoked two abortion doctors’ 
hospital admitting privileges.163 The doctors received identical letters 
explaining that their privileges were revoked because the hospital had 
learned that the doctors perform abortions and performing abortions 
amounts to unacceptable “disruptive behavior.”164  
Nevertheless, as Judge Posner noted, “pretext aside,” one 
common and lawful criteria used to evaluate whether to grant 
admitting privileges to a doctor is “the number of patient admissions a 
doctor can be expected to produce for the hospital.”165 Typically, 
hospitals want to grant privileges to doctors who will likely admit 
many patients; these doctors generate more revenue for the hospital 
because admitted patients require more hospital employees and staff to 
care for them.166 However, using this criterion to decide whether to 
grant these privileges is problematic for abortion doctors because very 
few abortions, a “negligible” number, result in complications requiring 
hospitalization.167 An “even smaller fraction” of these complications 
                                                 
162 Id.  
163 Texas Hospital Discriminates Against Physicians Providing Abortion 
Services, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/Texas-Hospital-Discriminates-Against-
Physicians-Providing-Abortion-Services. 
164 Id. (linking to one of the letters at 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/UGHDLetter.
pdf) (last visited Apr. 18, 2014). After filing a lawsuit and settling with the hospital 
out of court, the physicians’ admitting privileges were reinstated. Becca Aaronson & 
Alexa Ura, 2 Abortion Doctors Settle Suit Over Revoked Privileges, THE TEXAS 
TRIBUNE (June 10, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/06/10/abortion-doctors-
sue-hospital-revoking-privileges/. 
165 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 792–93. 
166 Id. at 793. 
167 Id.  
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are likely to arise when a woman is located near the hospital where the 
doctor who performed the abortion has admitting privileges, making it 
likely a woman suffering from abortion related complications would 
visit a different hospital for treatment.168  
 Even moving beyond Judge Posner’s reasoning in Van Hollen, 
the American Medical Association (AMA) has criticized hospital 
credentialing committees’ use of criterion that takes into account a 
doctor’s anticipated number of patient admittances.169 The AMA 
issued an opinion in 1994 stating, “[d]ecisions regarding hospital 
privileges should be based upon the training, experience, and 
demonstrated competence of candidates, taking into consideration the 
availability of facilities and the overall medical needs of the 
community, the hospital, and especially patients. Privileges should not 
be based on numbers of patients admitted to the facility.”170 Thus, 
when the number of patients a doctor will admit is factored into the 
admitting privileges calculus, hospital administrators can easily and 
lawfully deny abortion doctors these privileges; physicians who 
perform abortions are unlikely to generate much business for the 
hospital.171  
When evaluating the constitutionality of these statutes, the 
Supreme Court should remain cognizant of the fact that hospital 
administrators have the ability to arbitrarily deny doctors admitting 
privileges. Hospital administrators are not held accountable for their 
choices because they are not required to use a transparent and 
standardized process when deciding who will receive admitting 
privileges. The lack of transparency and subjective nature of the 
process for deciding whether to grant a doctor admitting privileges 
                                                 
168 See id. (noting that the state did not dispute the district court’s finding that 
“up to half of the complications will not present themselves until after the patient is 
home”). 
169 Id. at 792–93. 
170 Opinion 4.07–Staff Privileges, AM. MED. ASS’N. (June 1994), 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-
medical-ethics/opinion407.page. 
171 See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 793. 
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places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an 
abortion. Hospitals can arbitrarily and significantly restrict the number 
of doctors eligible to perform abortions in a given state by denying 
doctors these requisite admitting privileges. 
 
3. The Substantial Impact of Hospital Admitting Privilege 
Requirements on the Practical Availability of Abortion in a State 
 
Where enacted, these TRAP laws impose an undue burden on 
women who are trying to obtain abortions because of the likeliness 
that these laws will greatly reduce the number of doctors and clinics 
that perform abortions.172 As Judge Posner reasoned in Van Hollen, 
clinic closures and the “sudden shortage of eligible doctors” to 
perform abortions will likely create a substantial delay in a woman’s 
ability to obtain an abortion and may “result in the progression of 
pregnancy to a stage at which an abortion would be less safe, and 
eventually illegal.”173 When evaluating the constitutionality of 
admitting privileges statutes, the Supreme Court should take into 
account the substantial impact that these laws will have on the 
practical availability of abortion when clinics are forced to close and 
women are unduly burdened as a result.174  
In Van Hollen, Judge Posner explained that two of Wisconsin’s 
four abortion clinics will be forced to close if Wisconsin’s law goes 
into effect and a third clinic will lose half of its abortion doctors.175 
Many of the doctors at Planned Parenthood work at more than one 
clinic, so each doctor must obtain admitting privileges at multiple 
hospitals, which will cause a delay in the provision of abortions within 
the state.176 Since these doctors must wait to obtain privileges before 
providing abortions, clinics will shut down or staff will be reduced 
                                                 
172 See id. at 795–96. 
173 Id. at 796. 
174 See id. at 791–98.  
175 Id. at 789. 
176 Id. at 791. 
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until these privileges are granted.177 Furthermore, because 60-percent 
of the patients served by the state’s four abortion clinics have incomes 
below the federal poverty line, “some patients will be unable to afford 
the longer trips they’ll have to make to obtain an abortion when the 
clinics near them shut down.”178 Thus, poor women become unduly 
burdened as a result of the implementation of these statutes.  
Nationally, the percentage of women seeking an abortion with an 
income 100-percent below the federal poverty line drops slightly to 
42-percent;179 however, a significant portion of women obtaining 
abortions throughout the United States are low-income and regulations 
that force clinics to close only make it increasingly difficult for these 
women to obtain abortions. For example, if the Wisconsin law is 
permitted to take effect, one of the clinics that will be forced to close 
is located in Appleton.180 Appleton is located near the center of the 
state, and the two clinics that would remain open are both about one 
hundred miles south of Appleton.181 Thus, a low-income woman who 
lives north of Appleton and does not live near the Minnesota border, 
must travel up to an additional one hundred miles in each direction to 
obtain an abortion.182 
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG) and the AMA’s amici brief for the Abbott case further 
illustrates the hardship that clinic closures place on low-income 
women.183 The ACOG and AMA noted in their brief, that 40-percent 
of women obtaining abortions in Texas fall below the federal poverty 
                                                 
177 Id. at 789. 
178 See id. at 796. 
179 See Fact Sheet: Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(February 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html. 
180 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 796. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 See Brief of Amici Curiae American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists and the American Medical Association in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees and in Support of Affirmance at 9–10, Planned Parenthood of Greater 
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (2013) (No. 13-51008). 
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line.184 The brief then discussed how surveys have revealed that low-
income women often need time “to raise money [to obtain an 
abortion], including for travel” and that low-income women often 
delay having abortions because they lack the financial means to obtain 
an abortion.185 The ACOG and AMA explain that delaying an abortion 
for financial reasons or otherwise has real consequences—it “increases 
[a woman’s] exposure to complications and risks.”186  
The Abbott court stated that this “incidental effect” of making it 
more expensive or difficult for a woman to obtain an abortion is not 
alone enough to invalidate a law.187 However, these admitting 
privileges statutes have more than an “incidental effect” on poor 
women. They place a “nontrivial burden on the financially strapped” 
and other women who have difficulty traveling long-distances, “such 
as those who already have children.”188 As Judge Posner noted in the 
case of the Appleton clinic, this additional two hundred-mile trip really 
translates to a four hundred-mile trip because the state also requires a 
woman to wait 24-hours before having an abortion.189  
Thus, the effect of these admitting privileges statutes becomes 
even more unduly burdensome when considered in conjunction with 
other abortion regulations. Even if the Supreme Court were to decide 
that the admitting privileges statutes alone are not enough to impose 
an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion, when combined 
with other abortion regulations, these statutes impose an undue burden 
on women.190 As Judge Posner observed in Van Hollen, “when one 
                                                 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 10. 
187 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 
F.3d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 2013). 
188 Id. 
189 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 796 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
190 See State Facts About Abortion: Texas, GUTTMACHER INST. (April 2014) 
(http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/texas.html); see also Rachel Benson Gold & 
Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain Political Traction While Abortion Clinics—and 
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abortion regulation compounds the effects of another, the aggregate 
effects on abortion rights must be considered.”191 
 Judge Posner’s reasoning regarding the aggregate effect of these 
laws applies beyond the borders of Wisconsin because many states 
heavily regulate abortion.192 For example, the financial burden on a 
large proportion of Texas women seeking abortions is further 
compounded when hospital admitting privileges requirements are 
applied on top of existing state laws which require a woman to both 
receive “state-directed counseling” and wait 24-hours before having an 
abortion.193 Moreover, after the admitting privileges statute went into 
effect in Texas, one-third of the state’s thirty clinics closed.194 As a 
result, many low-income women in Texas must not only make 
multiple trips to obtain an abortion, they must also travel to clinics 
located even farther from their homes.195  
A study by the Guttmacher Institute further reinforces the idea 
that these laws compound to substantially restrict the practical 
availability of abortion in a state and create an undue burden on 
                                                                                                                   
the Women They Serve—Pay the Price, 16 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2013, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/16/2/gpr160207.html (describing the influx of 
TRAP laws in the United States and how these laws exacerbate clinic closures).  
191 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 796. 
192 Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion 
Restrictions Puts Providers—and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, 17 
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. (2014), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/17/1/gpr170109.html. 
193 See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 190. 
194 Eckholm, supra note 124. 
195 See THE TEXAS POLICY EVALUATION PROJECT, Texas State Abortion Rate 
Decreases 13 Percent Since Implementation of Restrictive Law: Number of abortion 
clinics falls from 41 to 22 over same period (July 23, 2014), 
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/orgs/txpep/_files/pdf/7-23-14-TxPEP-
AbortionRateDecreases-Press-Release.pdf (stating the number of women of 
reproductive age in Texas living in a county more than 200 miles from a clinic 
providing abortion in Texas increased from 10,000 in April 2013 to 290,000 by 
April 2014).   
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women seeking abortions.196 Between 2011 and 2013, thirty states 
enacted 205 new abortion restrictions, totaling more than the “number 
that had been enacted in the entire previous decade.”197 The 
Guttmacher Institute study identified ten categories of major abortion 
restrictions; it then assessed whether a state had enacted at least one 
provision from any of these categories in the years 2000, 2010, and 
2013.198 In the study, “[a] state was considered “supportive” of 
abortion rights if it had enacted provisions in no more than one of the 
restrictive categories, “middle ground” if it had enacted provisions in 
two or three, and “hostile” if it had enacted provisions in four or 
more.”199 According to the study, “the overall number of states hostile 
to abortion rights has grown since 2000, while the number of 
supportive and middle-ground states has shrunk. In 2000, 13 states 
were hostile to abortion rights; by 2010, that number was 22, and by 
2013, it was 27.”200  
 “[T]he cohort of states already hostile to abortion rights was 
responsible for nearly all of the abortion restrictions enacted in 
2013.”201 These new restrictions have dramatically altered the abortion 
policy landscape.202 The influx in abortion regulation since 2011 has 
had the effect of piling abortion regulations on top of each other, 
particularly in hostile states.203 When examined in the aggregate, these 
laws have made it unduly burdensome for a woman to exercise her 
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy. As the Guttmacher 
Institute observed, doctors must meet very robust, stringent and 
                                                 





201 Id. (“In 2000, only two states—Mississippi and Utah—had five of the 10 
major types of restrictions in effect. By 2013, 18 states had six or more major 
restrictions, and seven states had eight or more. Louisiana, the most restrictive state 
in 2013, had 10.”). 
202 Id. 
203 See id. 
31
Koss: Judge Posner Got It Right: Requiring Abortion Doctors to Have Hos
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014




expensive regulatory requirements to provide abortion services in a 
given state.204 As doctors struggle to implement these regulatory 
requirements, clinics close and women have no choice but to travel 
farther, spend more money, and wait longer to obtain abortions.205  
 
B. Admitting Privileges TRAP Laws are not Rationally Related to their 
Purported Purpose of Protecting Maternal Health 
 
In Van Hollen and Abbott, the State asserted that the rationale for 
requiring abortion doctors to have hospital admitting privileges is to 
protect maternal health.206 However, these admitting privileges statutes 
bear no rational relation to their purported purpose because very few 
abortions result in complications that require hospitalization. 
Moreover, the medical community does not believe that abortion 
doctors need to provide “continuity of care” to ensure optimal 
treatment for patients207 or that requiring continuity of care even aligns 
with medical best practices.208 
First, in Van Hollen, “no documentation of medical evidence” was 
presented to the Wisconsin legislature demonstrating “a medical need” 
for requiring doctors to have admitting privileges.209 Generally, the 
medical community considers surgical abortion a relatively safe and 
low-risk procedure when compared to other outpatient medical 
procedures.210 As noted by the district court in Van Hollen, “the risk of 
                                                 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 789 (7th 
Cir. 2013); see Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 
734 F.3d 406, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2013). 
207 See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 789. 
208 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 
(W.D. Wis. 2013). 
209 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 789. 
210 Elizabeth Flock, Docs: Texas Abortion Bill Doesn’t Make Sense, U.S. 
NEWS AND WORLD REP. (June 27, 2013), 
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death associated with childbirth is 14 times higher than that associated 
with abortion. The risk of death related to abortion overall is less than 
0.7 deaths per 100,000 procedures.”211 Abortion complications “are 
estimated to occur in only one out of 111 physician-performed 
aspiration abortions (the most common type of surgical abortion); and 
96 percent of complications are ‘minor.’”212 In fact, a recent study 
found that “only 1 in 1,915 aspiration abortions (0.05%)” results in 
complications that require hospitalization.213 These statistics are 
staggering when compared to studies demonstrating that the rate of 
complications arising from colonoscopies is significantly higher than 
that of abortions—yet doctors performing colonoscopies are not 
required to have hospital admitting privileges.214  
Furthermore, in Van Hollen, Judge Posner noted that doctors who 
perform outpatient surgeries, such as various arthroscopic or 
laparoscopic procedures, are not required to have hospital admitting 
privileges.215 He observed that doctors who perform surgical abortion 
often perform other similar gynecological procedures, such as 
“surgical completion of a miscarriage,”216 and these doctors are not 
required to have admitting privileges when performing a procedure 
that “appear[s] to be virtually indistinguishable from an abortion from 
a medical standpoint.”217 Even doctors performing other outpatient 
surgeries that require general anesthesia, are not required to have 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/06/27/obgyn-docs-say-provisions-in-
filibustered-texas-abortion-bill-dont-make-sense. 
211 Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 863. 
212 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 797. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 790. 
215 Id. (citing a study showing that “a quarter of all surgery in the United States 
is performed outside of hospitals”). 
216 Id. (explaining this procedure occurs when a doctor removes the remaining 
fetal tissue from a woman’s uterus following a miscarriage and likening this 
procedure to a “spontaneous abortion”). 
217 Id. 
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admitting privileges,218 despite the fact that ACOG believes that 
abortion is less risky than the use of general anesthesia.219 Thus, this 
statute does not further its purported rationale of protecting the health 
of the mother because surgical abortions are relatively safe.220 Women 
who have had a surgical abortion do not typically experience 
complications that require hospitalization.221 
Yet, anti-abortion advocates argue that if a woman is hospitalized 
from abortion-related complications, she will receive “better 
continuity of care” if the doctor who performed the abortion has 
hospital admitting privileges and can continue to treat her.222 However, 
even in the rare instance where a patient requires hospitalization, the 
appropriate doctor to manage the patient’s care may be a subspecialist 
and not the physician who performed the abortion.223 For example, if 
the patient has “a cardiac or lung related complication [she] should be 
seen by a cardiologist or a pulmonologist” rather than the doctor who 
performed the abortion.224 Moreover, as the district court in Van 
Hollen observed, the admitting privileges requirement runs “counter to 
the current hospital care model, which increasingly relies on dedicated 
staff physicians or ‘hospitalists,’ including an on-call ob-gyn, rather 
than the outdated model that relies on physicians who provide 
outpatient care with hospital privileges.”225 Thus, the practice of 
highly qualified outpatient physicians, such as abortion doctors, 
handing off care to a hospital-employed physician is congruent with 
                                                 
218 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 166. 
219 Id. (citing Flock, supra note 210). 
220 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 789, 797. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 789. 
223 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 166. 
224 Id.  
225 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 
(W.D. Wis. 2013). 
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best practices in hospital care and does not constitute “patient 
abandonment.”226  
Even the ACOG has publicly condemned these admitting 
privileges TRAP laws, stating that they are unnecessary for “the 
provision of safe abortions.”227 ACOG guidelines recommend that 
clinicians who provide abortions outside of a hospital should have 
protocols in place to transfer patients to a hospital if complications 
arise.228 Lisa Hollier, chair of the Texas district of ACOG, noted, 
"[T]he [hospital admitting privileges] regulations are much more 
stringent than for other surgical procedures at similar risk, such as 
a colonoscopy."229 Thus, as Judge Posner states, absent a requirement 
that physicians performing similar or riskier outpatient procedures 
have hospital admitting privileges, the only purpose the Wisconsin 
legislature could have when enacting this law was to restrict access to 
safe and legal abortions within the state.230  
 
C. Admitting Privileges Statutes Violate the Equal Protections Clause 
by Discriminating Against Doctors who Perform Abortions 
 
Beyond the fact that these admitting privileges laws do not bear 
any rational relationship to protecting maternal health, they also 
violate equal protections of the law.231 As Judge Posner stated in Van 
Hollen, “the state seems indifferent to complications from non-
hospital procedures other than surgical abortion (especially other 
gynecological procedures) even when they are more likely to produce 
complications.”232 In fact, the incidence of complications of abortion 
                                                 
226 Id. 
227 Shainwald, supra note 5, at 165 (citations omitted). 
228 Id. 
229 Flock, supra note 210. 
230 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 790–91 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
231 See id. at 789–90. 
232 Id. at 790. 
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is so low that the Court cited the State’s report, which noted that in 
2012 there were “only 11 complications out of 6,692 abortions” in 
Wisconsin.233 Therefore, complications occurred at “a rate of less than 
1.6 tenths of 1 percent (1 per 608 abortions).”234 There is no 
reasonable justification for singling out abortion providers for 
additional medical oversight when the rate of complications related to 
surgical abortions is significantly lower than the rate of complications 
associated with similar outpatient surgical procedures.235 
Anti-abortion advocates argue that requiring abortion doctors to 
have admitting privileges at a local hospital acts as a “Good 
Housingkeeping Seal of Approval,” a testament to the competence of 
the physician.236 According to the Fifth Circuit’s Abbott decision, the 
State has a “substantial interest” in regulating and “protecting the 
integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”237 Writing for the 
court, Judge Owen believed that requiring local admitting privileges 
furthered this interest.238 She stated, “the State offered evidence that 
such a requirement fosters a woman’s ability to seek consultation and 
treatment for complications directly from her physician, not from an 
emergency room provider.”239 Judge Owen cited testimony from 
multiple doctors who argue that this requirement provides additional 
oversight beyond the initial licensing and license renewal process, 
which helps ensure high quality patient care and the quality of doctors 
permitted to perform abortions.240 These doctors argued this extra-
layer of “protection for patient safety” is necessary because the stigma 
attached to abortion makes it likely that complications are likely 
                                                 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 797. 
236 See id.  
237 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 
F.3d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 2013). 
238 Id. 
239 Id.  
240 Id. 411–12. 
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underreported.241 However, in Van Hollen, the State did not present 
any evidence to support the claim that abortion-related complications 
were underreported, which calls into question the doctors’ reasoning in 
Abbott that abortions are likely underreported.242  
 Moreover, as noted previously, best practices in hospital care do 
not require physicians from outpatient clinics to continue to provide 
care at a hospital when complications do arise.243 According to the 
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ brief in Van Hollen, when a complication arises 
in outpatient medicine, “hospitals provide emergency care to patients 
who need it, including admitting the patients if necessary, regardless of 
whether the physician who provided the outpatient care has admitting 
privileges at that hospital.”244  
In fact, in the case of Wisconsin’s statute, “nothing [in the statute] 
. . . requires an abortion doctor who has admitting privileges to care 
for a patient . . . [h]e doesn’t have to accompany her to the hospital, 
treat her there, visit her, call her, or indeed do anything that a doctor 
employed by the hospital might not do for the patient.”245 Thus, it is 
unconstitutional to require extra oversight of abortion doctors when 
physicians performing equally invasive procedures are not monitored 
in this manner and there are no statutory provisions requiring 
physicians who perform outpatient surgical procedures to provide 
continuity of care to their patients. 
  
                                                 
241 See id. at 412. 
242 See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 790 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
243 Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858, 864 
(W.D. Wis. 2013). 
244 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 13–14, Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. 
Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (2014) (No. 13-2726) (“Transfers of care between 
physicians occur routinely in medicine. Dr. Hargarten testified that such transfers 
occur ‘every day from other hospitals and physicians in cases where those physicians 
cannot provide the definitive treatment the patient requires,’ and the ‘transferring 
physician is rarely, if ever’ on the staff of the hospital.”). 
245 Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 798. 
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 Although the Supreme Court has yet to evaluate the 
constitutionality of admitting privileges TRAP laws, when it does, the 
Court should rely on Judge Posner’s reasoning in Van Hollen to reach 
its decision. Even though Judge Posner’s opinion relied on the facts in 
the record for Van Hollen, his reasoning can be expanded beyond the 
borders of Wisconsin. As one state successfully promulgates a 
regulation restricting access to abortion, other states follow suit by 
enacting similar statutes, resulting in an influx of abortion regulation 
and making it increasingly difficult for a woman to obtain an abortion 
in the United States.  
Thus, although the combination of abortion regulations may vary 
from state to state, access to abortion is a universal concern. When the 
Supreme Court has the opportunity to make a decision about the 
constitutionality of hospital admitting privileges statutes, it should 
strike them down. These laws impose an undue burden on a woman 
seeking to exercise her fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy; 
they bear no rational relation to their purported purpose of protecting 
maternal health; and they violate equal protections of the laws through 
disparate treatment of abortion doctors. 
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